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Abstract This paper addresses the anomaly detection problem in large-scale data mining
applications using residual subspace analysis. We are specifically concerned with situations
where the full data cannot be practically obtained due to physical limitations such as low
bandwidth, limited memory, storage, or computing power. Motivated by the recent com-
pressed sensing (CS) theory, we suggest a framework wherein random projection can be
used to obtained compressed data, addressing the scalability challenge. Our theoretical con-
tribution shows that the spectral property of the CS data is approximately preserved under
a such a projection and thus the performance of spectral-based methods for anomaly de-
tection is almost equivalent to the case in which the raw data is completely available. Our
second contribution is the construction of the framework to use this result and detect anoma-
lies in the compressed data directly, thus circumventing the problems of data acquisition in
large sensor networks. We have conducted extensive experiments to detect anomalies in net-
work and surveillance applications on large datasets, including the benchmark PETS 2007
and 83GB of real footage from 3 public train stations. Our results show that our proposed
method is scalable, and importantly, its performance is comparable to conventional methods
for anomaly detection when the complete data is available.
Keywords anomaly detection · random projection · sensor network data · spectral
methods · compressed sensing · residual subspace analysis · stream data processing
1 Introduction
The problem of detecting anomalies in data streams captured by large-scale sensor networks
has received much interest [5,13,23,36,40] over the past decade. As large-scale networks
become prevalent, there is an increasing need to develop approaches that can address the
challenges arising from large amounts of data. The problem affects a wide range of applica-
tions as the data captured by sensor networks constitutes multimedia content from the web,
video from surveillance camera networks, satellite imagery or typical network traffic.
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Approaches to anomaly detection vary significantly in the scope of the detection, the
underlying statistical methods, as well as the assumption about the data. As there are varying
differences between the definition of anomalies in different settings, it is usually difficult to
directly compare the methods in the literature. Examples include Bayesian methods [27,
28], SVM [19], example-based [43] and spectral methods [6], mixed-type data [29]. A more
complete survey of anomaly detection is documented in [12].
We restrict our attention to spectral methods for anomaly detection, in particular to resid-
ual subspace analysis. This method was originally developed for control system theory [24],
[25], [26]. It decomposes data into the principal subspace that characterizes the normal be-
havior of data, and the residual subspace where anomalies are to be found. Under the null
hypothesis that the data is normal, the squared prediction error (SPE) which is the l2-norm
of the residual vector, follows a non-central chi-square distribution. Hence, the rejection of
the null hypothesis can be based on whether the norm of the residual vector exceeds a cer-
tain threshold corresponding to a desired false alarm rate. The threshold is computed based
on a statistical measure called Q-statistic [24], [31], [23], which can be computed as a func-
tion of residual eigenvalues. Recently, this method has found use in some network anomaly
detection problems [30].
Let xi ∈ RN be a N -dimensional vector that represents the status of a data network
with N sensors at time i, and denote as X = [x1, . . . ,xL] the network data matrix. We
consider two cases:
Case 1: It is difficult to collect all rows of the data matrix X to a central monitor. This
could be because of limited bandwidth between the central node and the sensors such that
only M readings can be sent over the communications link, where typically M ≪ N . In
other circumstances, many sensors of the network may be physically far away from the
central node and such direct communication with the central node may be impossible. Fur-
thermore, the central node may not have storage for all sensors due to memory limitations.
In this situation, it is desirable to summarize the status of the sensor network with an M -
dimensional reading such that it meets both the bandwidth and memory constraints.
Case 2: It is difficult to collect all columns of the data matrix X centrally. This is equiv-
alent to sub-sampling the temporal stream. This is useful in situations where anomalies have
to be found retrospectively. For example, the video data of a network of surveillance cam-
eras may be fully available at remote nodes, and when an incident occurs, the authorities
want to access the data centrally. It is however impossible to transmit the entire temporal
stream to a central location. In this case, the temporal stream must be sub-sampled.
Inspired by the recent compressed sensing (CS) theory [14,11], we propose a new frame-
work for the detection of anomalies in such large-scale networks. The proposed framework
consists of a strategy to handle large data using compressed sensing/random projection and a
traditional spectral-based anomaly detection algorithm. We formalize the application of CS
to effectively acquire the data in a compressed way to conform to the physical constraints.
This compressed data acquisition permits either sub-sampling of the number of sensors, or
the number of frames in a temporal stream and is then used for anomaly detection. Though
for detection purpose, the acquisition part is essentially random projection [41], we note
that the CS theory certainly enables post anomaly detection tasks such as finding the ori-
gins of detected anomalies. As the CS theory is more general, hereinafter we refer to the
compressed data using random projection as CS data.
To address the issues, we propose to obtain the compressed data and then perform
anomaly detection using residual subspace analysis on it. We show how such a linear trans-
formation can be implemented in some large-scale networks. Our theoretical contributions
are:
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– First, we extend the theory of random projection/CS by establishing the relation between
the spectral properties of the original and compressed data. Specifically, we show that
the principal subspace is approximately preserved under the random projection with
high probability and we derive two-sided theoretical bounds. This demonstrates that the
intrinsic structure of the data is preserved under a random projection, and yields the
intuition that anomalies can be detected in the residual subspace of the compressed data.
– Second, we derive the theoretical bounds on the false alarm rate with compressed data
relative to complete data. The result shows that the bound is directly related to the di-
mension of random projection M .
We emphasize that the strategy using compressed sensing/random projection that we
analyze in this work is mostly suitable for spectral-based anomaly detection algorithms,
which mainly depend on the singular values of the data. However, this scalability strategy
might also be useful for other non-spectral anomaly detection algorithms. Such a study to
examine the possible benefit is certainly beyond the scope of current work.
We validate our method by considering both network and surveillance anomalies. For
the network data, we evaluate the proposed method on real traffic traces collected from the
Abilene network [1] over four weeks and synthetic network data. Our experiment verifies
that on the real dataset, the proposed method using compressed data achieves equivalent
performance as with complete data at a detection rate of more than 94%. For synthetic data,
our experiments show that the PCA technique performs even better in compressed domain
than original domain for high dimensional data. Importantly, the proposed method requires
less memory and storage and can be as much as 100 times faster than the original spectral
method using raw data.
For the surveillance data, we validate our method on both a benchmark dataset [2]
(64MB) and real-world data collected from multiple surveillance cameras from 3 train sta-
tions over a whole week, resulting in over 83GB of video. To the best of our knowledge, the
latter is the largest dataset mentioned in the video surveillance literature. It contains anoma-
lous events that were not artificially created and were ground-truthed in conjunction with
the transport authorities. The satisfactory performance of our method over different datasets
offers promise for deployment in real-world scenarios 1
The significance of our contributions is the demonstration that spectral-based methods
can be applied to CS data, and that anomaly detection can be effectively performed without
an explicit reconstruction of the input signal. Thus, anomaly detection is equivalent to the
uncompressed case, but with the advantage of working with lower number of measurements.
Accordingly, the computational cost is also reduced.
In terms of novelty, the framework we present integrates anomaly detection and random
projection into a deployable paradigm to overcome the problem with partial data, a reality in
most real-world situations. Though it is intuitive from the approximate geometry preserva-
tion of random projection that the eigenvalues should be “similar”, establishing the precise
bounds on eigenvalues and on the false alarm rates here is new and significant. The closest
theoretical work on the bounds of eigenvalues due to random projection is given in [41,
Section 8.2]. However, Lemma 8.4 in [41] only provides the upper bound, whilst our result
provides both upper and lower bounds using the theory of invariant subspaces. Furthermore,
their result in [41, Section 8.2] is not probabilistic, thus ignores the essence of random pro-
jections. Some similar theoretical results to [41] are presented in [32], but the application
1 Though we only report these amounts of data in this paper, we note that the proposed method forms a
core of a more complex commercial system that has been successfully tested over thousand hours of video,
equivalent to hundred of Tetrabyes. For detail see http://www.icetana.com.au
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is concentrated on using random projection as a privacy preserving mechanism rather than
anomaly detection in large-scale data. This work extends our our preliminary investigation
[9] by theoretical results with detailed proofs and a more extensive experimental evaluation
to validate our claims.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss related prior work. Section 3
describes the problem in detail and provides some relevant background. Section 4 explains
our proposed method and its analysis. Section 5 describes the data sets, experimental setup
and results while conclusions are presented in Section 6.
2 Related Work
There are mainly three major approaches to address scalability issues in large-scale networks
that are generally applicable to many problems.
The first approach is column sampling [15], [16], which is only suitable for static database
applications. In this approach, an empirical distribution over the columns of X is constructed
and a small number of columns of X are selected based on sampling from the empirical dis-
tribution. Due to the nature of having the full knowledge about the empirical distribution to
do selective sampling, this approach appears unsuitable for online applications.
The second approach is decentralization where nodes in the network actively make de-
cisions about communication and processing so as to reduce bandwidth consumption. For
example, Huang et al. [23] propose a decentralization method for streaming data in which
the sensors only send information to the fusion point if the observed value falls outside the
normal range, which is a typically pre-defined window. If a sensor does not send any data,
the fusion point will assume a nominal value. The essence of [23] is an optimized trade-off
between the pre-defined window length (which implies the amount of reduction in commu-
nication overhead) and the changes in the detection performance of the matching spectral
method. However, there is still a likelihood that the communication overhead exceeds the
bandwidth and the fact that the central node would need to store a data matrix of the same
size as X.
The third approach is dimensionality reduction, where the data is transformed to a
(much) lower dimension. Within this approach, there are supervised methods that require
a complex optimization problem to be solved such as [42]. A recent work [21], which ad-
dresses a slightly different problem, uses a local sensitive hashing scheme to reduce the
dimensionality of wireless sensors readings. Our proposed framework falls in the realm of
unsupervised linear transformation, in particular that of random projection [41] (We note
that from CS theory, some deterministic linear transformation might work equivalently but
such a discussion is beyond the scope of this paper). This dimensionality reduction tech-
nique exploits a special statistical property of high-dimensional data wherein the geometry
is approximately preserved under such transformation. Whilst the applications of random
projection, more generally CS, have been found in a wide range of domains, such as pre-
serving privacy [32] (see [41] for a more comprehensive list), to the best of our knowledge
there is no work in its application to anomaly detection, especially with residual subspace
analysis.
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3 Background
3.1 Residual Subspace Projection and Anomaly Detection
Let the information about a network be represented by a matrix X = [x1,x2, . . . ,xL]
where each data instance xi ∈ RN . For notational simplicity, we assume the data matrix
has been centralized. If X is available, the residual method performs the eigenvalue decom-
position of the sample covariance matrix as:
Σx = (1/L)XX
T = UΛUT (1)
from which the K principal eigenvectors U corresponding to the largest K eigenvalues can
be found. The projection of any data instance x onto the residual subspace is given as:
z = (I − UUT )x. (2)
In residual subspace analysis [24], the error signal (z) is assumed to be multivariate nor-
mally distributed and hence the squared prediction error (SPE) ‖z‖22 follows a non-central
chi-square distribution under the null hypothesis that the data is normal. Hence, rejection
of the null hypothesis can be based on whether norm of the error vector exceeds a certain
threshold corresponding to a desired false alarm rate. The threshold is called Q-statistic, and
it is a function of non-principal eigenvalues in residual subspace. For a significance level β,






















j for i = 1, 2, 3, cβ = (1 − β) percentile in a
standard normal distribution, and λj , i = 1, . . . , M are the eigenvalues of Σx. An anomaly
is detected when ‖z‖22 > Qβ . (see Fig. 1 for an illustration).
In practice, it is important to select a suitable value for K. Like most other spectral meth-
ods, the general principle for selecting K is the smallest number of principal components
that capture most of the energy. For residual subspace methods, the selection of K is always
a trade-off. Selecting small K makes the residual subspace large, and hence can improve
detection but may increase false positives. On the other hand, selecting large K makes the
residual subspace small, and hence reduces false positives but may increase false negatives.
In our work, we select K to capture about 90% of energy in the principal subspace.
3.2 From Random Projection To Compressed Sensing
It has been observed in the literature that though the dimension of the data may be large, the
intrinsic dimension which carries most information about the data is typically much smaller.
This has motivated a large number of works on dimensionality reduction. They all aim at
yielding compressed data that is easier to work with. In most cases, this contains less noise
than that with original data. A particular common class of dimensionality reduction is linear
transformation, wherein the compressed data y is obtained through a linear transformation
6 Duc-Son Pham† et al.





Fig. 1 Anomaly detection with residual subspace analysis. Here the data samples x1 to x6 mostly align with
the principal subspace as their projection to the residual subspace, which is illustrated by a plane, is small
than a threshold. However, the projection of x7 onto the residual subspace is large, implying an anomaly.
y = Φx. Here Φ ∈ RM×N effectively reduces the dimension of the data from N to M
and its columns are normalized to unit norm. If the intrinsic dimension is K then obviously
M ≥ K. In compressed sensing theory, suppose that x is a K sparse vector, then a a
linear transformation Φ is characterized by a so-called restricted isometry constant (RIC)
δK , which satisfies
(1 − δK)‖x‖22 ≤ ‖Φx‖22 ≤ (1 + δK)‖x‖22. (4)
These inequalities describe the approximate geometry preservation property of Φ. Ideally, a
good linear transformation corresponds to small δK . To achieve this, the columns of Φ need
to be as close to orthogonal as possible. Under CS theory, Φ does not have to be a random
matrix and in fact there are published works that construct Φ deterministically. However, it
is found that many classes of random matrices often have small RIC and can be easily gener-
ated, such as Bernoulli random matrices, database friendly random matrices, and Gaussian
random matrices [11,3,41]. It also follows from CS theory that the dimensions of random
projection is M = O(K log N) ≪ N for large N . This implies that by using random
projection, the compressed data could have a smaller dimension than the original data with-
out losing its geometrical property. Because of the non-adaptive nature, such compression
is suitable for large-scale problems (For further detail of these random matrices, see [11,3,
41]).
Before proceeding, we note that the above geometry preserving projection holds for
data x that is sparse via some unitary transform, i.e. x = Ψα and that α is K-sparse. In
this case ΦΨ is effectively the linear projection. Because Φ is random and Ψ is unitary,
the statistical property remains unchanged (This can be proved easily). Secondly, though
we only focus on anomaly detection in this work, the CS theory states that the original data
x can be reconstructed from the compressed data y by solving the following optimization
problem:
x̂ = arg min
x
‖y − Φx‖22 + λ‖x‖1. (5)


























Fig. 2 Sensor subsampling. Here the synchronized sensors effectively perform cross-network compressed
measurements via gossips, indicated by the red arrows. After a number of gossips, the final compressed
measurements will arrive at the center node.
Here λ is a regularization parameter, which controls the sparsity of the solution, and is
typically found by cross-validation techniques, the detail of which can be found more in the
CS literature. From an anomaly detection point of view, this implies that post-processing
tasks of anomaly detection, such as identification of anomalies might be possible under CS
theory. However, we leave this for future work. In what follows, we focus on obtaining an




In the first step of the proposed framework, we obtain compressed data using random pro-
jection. Mathematically speaking, we denote the complete data matrix as X ∈ RN×L and
the actual data matrix available for processing as Y ∈ RN ′×L′ after applying random pro-
jection on a large network. The reduction in either N ′ or L′ depends on whether this linear
compression is deployed for reducing the feature dimension or time instances to meet the
network constraints. We revisit the two cases considered previously:
Case 1: Sensor sub-sampling: We seek a linear transformation on the data y = Φx
where the random matrix Φ ∈ RM×N has entries as random variables. There are some
known classes of random matrices suitable for large-scale networks. For example, in the
database friendly matrices [3] the entries can take values of either 0 with probability 2/3
or ±1 with probability 1/6. If all sensors have synchronized clocks and the same random
generator, a rule can be set up so that the sensors send their pre-modulated reading with ±1
depending on the value of the random generator. Alternatively, when the sensors cannot di-
rectly reach the central node, the random gossip algorithm [38] can be applied to propagate
the projection y to the central node (see Fig. 2 for an illustration). The additional advantage
over the decentralization approach is that the central node can now perform the analysis
using the residual method on the compressed data y. We show both theoretically and exper-
imentally in subsequent sections that the performance of the detector is nearly as optimal as
if the whole data matrix X were available.
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Case 2: Temporal stream frame sub-sampling: In this scheme, the operator can request
the server to generate random numbers having values ±1 and modulate the data with these
random numbers, accumulating the values for L′ different iterations where L′ ≪ L (see
Fig. 3 for an illustration). We show that by doing sub-sampling, limited bandwidth and
storage can be efficiently utilized to detect anomalies as successfully as if the full data X is
available.
In the second step, we perform anomaly detection using compressed data. Instead of
using X which is not available, we now apply the residual method on the compressed data
Y, i.e. compute its eigenvalues and hence obtain the Q-statistic to determine the presence
of an anomaly.
4.2 Theoretical analysis
With the following theoretical analysis, we aim at proving that doing anomaly detection
with residual subspace analysis using compressed data obtained from random projection is
approximately equivalent to that using complete data. Our theoretical analysis is based on
relative performance to the complete data X. Even though this complete data X is not prac-
tically available, a relative comparison can provide a guarantee on near optimal performance
of any spectral-based detection method. To do this, we first study the changes in the eigen-
values (spectral properties) reflected in the compressed data as they constitute an important
factor for detection as shown in (3). The bounds on the eigenvalues of compressed data then
allow us to study the bounds on false alarm rates when the residual subspace method is
applied to the compressed data for anomaly detection.
4.2.1 Case 1: M readings from N sensors.
Random projection is used to compress the columns of X from N to M and the its relation
with the compressed data is given by
yi = Φxi,yi ∈ RM , i = 1 . . . L (6)
Denote the eigenvalues of the complete data X as λ1, . . . , λN , the eigenvalues of the
compressed data Y as ξi, i = 1, . . . , M , K as the number of principal eigenvalues in the
complete data X, such that K < M ≪ N . For simplicity, we assume that the CS matrix is
a random Gaussian matrix. Similar results can also be obtained for other random matrices,
Theorem 1 With a probability of at least 1 − δ, the changes in the eigenvalues are bound
by















for i = 1, . . . , K, where λ1 is the largest eigenvalue of Σx.
The theorem is a direct consequence of the concentration property of Gaussian ensembles
and the proof is detailed in Appendix 6.
Theorem 1 suggests that as the principal subspace spanned by X is approximately pre-
served in the compressed domain with high probability, and the intrinsic structure of the
data in the original input domain is unchanged under random projection (see Fig. 4 for an
illustration).
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Fig. 3 Temporal subsampling. Here the data x1, . . . ,x7 reside in a database. The data are ±1-randomly
modulated through a random generator, and the summation is taken over all data points to obtain temporally-






Fig. 4 Illustration of Theorem 1. The top plot depicts the eigenvalue distribution of data in the original
domain, whilst the bottom one shows that of the compressed domain. Theorem 1 essentially quantifies the
variation of the distribution for the principal (largest) eigenvalues.
We now discuss the implication of this result on anomaly detection in compressed data.
The detection of volume anomalies using the residual subspace method is entirely based on
the total power of the residuals, i.e. ‖z‖2, rather on the actual residual subspace itself as long
as it remains noise-like, i.e. no salient spectral features. It can be easily shown that when the
random matrix Φ is normalized (each column to unit norm), the total power is unchanged.
Thus, a small variation in the principal subspace directly translates to a small change in
the total power of the residual subspace. It means that as far as the statistic t = ‖z‖2 is
concerned, its distribution will also experience a small change when the compressed data
is used. This intuitive argument can be more formally stated by the following result, which
forms the basis for our proposed framework.
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Theorem 2 If the residual method is applied to the compressed data, with a probability of












The proof is detailed in Appendix 6.
We now investigate the effect of different factors on the changes in the false alarm rate.
If we fix δ in advance, the second term on the left hand side of (12) becomes significantly
small as the problem size, and thus M , becomes large. Therefore, for large-scale networks,
the first term is dominant. As mentioned above, the number of measurements M is related
to the sparsity via M = O(K log N) under CS theory. This implies that the first term will
decay at the rate O(
p
Klog(N)/N) and thus for large networks, this term is also small
if K ≪ N . Fortunately, for volume anomalies, the intrinsic dimension appears consistent
with this assumption [30].
4.2.2 Case 2 : Sub-sampling the number of data instances.
In the previous case, we used random projection to reduce the number of readings in data
streams. Effectively, this reduces the number of rows in the data matrix X, which is use-
ful when N is large. In a similar manner, we now show that the proposed framework can
be applied to the case when the number of instances is large. Effectively, we use random
projection to compress each L-dimensional row of the complete data matrix X to a M -
dimensional row of the matrix Y using a random matrix Φ ∈ RM×L, where M < L.
Mathematically, the relation between Y and X can be written as:
Y
T = ΦXT . (9)
In this case, N ′ = N and L′ = M . We now show that the results for the previous case are
applicable in this case. To see this, we start from the basic result in linear algebra that:
λi(XX
T ) = λi(X
T
X), i = 1, . . . , min(N, L). (10)
This implies that the changes in the principal eigenvalues of YYT relative to XXT is the
same as the changes in eigenvalues of YT Y relative to XT X and as YT and XT are related
in a similar manner as shown in (9), the previous result applies. The only minor difference is
that N should be replaced by L as the reduction is perform on the rows of X. The changes
in the principal eigenvalues are bounded by:



























with probability of at least 1 − δ.
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4.2.3 Complexity analysis
If the complete data X were available, the covariance matrix formation and eigenvalue de-
composition requires a computational power of O(N3) and memory storage of O(N2) in
the case of PCA. In a similar fashion, the complexity for SVD computation is O(LN2 +
L2N). In contrast, the complexities for the proposed framework (both computational and
storage) are only O(M3) and O(M2) respectively, where M = O(K log N). As previ-
ously discussed, when the intrinsic dimension of the complete data is small relative to its
size, significant reduction in both storage and complexity is achieved with the proposed
method. We also note that if the data is sparse in the original domain, then sparse-SVD or
PCA may be directly applicable. However, it is much more likely for the data to be sparse
only through an (unknown) orthogonal transformation. Since data is generally dense in the
original domain, sparse SVD is generally not applicable.
4.3 Justification of Theoretical Bounds
In what follow we examine whether the theoretical bounds derived previously are tight
enough so that they can be a general guidance for practical purposes. In other words, are the
bounds approximately at the order of the real deviation?
As the theoretical bound on the false alarm is naturally dependent on the bound of the
eigenvalues, we restrict the discussion to the bounds in Theorem 1. In this case, the Theo-
rem states that such a deviation of the eigenvalues should not exceed 4
√
2λ1∆ where ∆ is








For a 90% confidence, the term
p
2 ln(1/δ) is 2.1460, which is small. Thus, the dependence
is approximately
p
K/M . This dependence provides the implications for the application of
compressed sensing/random projection
– The bounds only make sense if the intrinsic dimension K is sufficiently small compared
with the reduced dimension M
– Compression-error trade-off. For a fixed intrinsic dimension K, better compression
would be achieved with a smaller M , however it also results in a larger possible de-
viation. On the contrary, error is made small when letting M/N → 1, but this defeats
the goal of compression. This mean in practice a value of M such that K ≪ M ≪ N
would provide a natural trade-off. In the compressed sensing theory, such a value of
M is typically chosen as M = O(K ln(N)), which appears to be suitable for the
compressed sensing recovery problem. In large-scale network problem, there are two
possible scenarios:
– The designer is given a maximum affordable M : in that case, the bounds serve as a
rough estimate of the the possible deviation due to using compressed data
– The designer is given a tolerance on the deviation: in this case, the bounds serves as
a rough estimate of the compression required to attain accuracy within the allowable
tolerance.
The theoretical bounds are derived on the assumption of distinct principal components. In
other words, the principal K eigenvalues are assume sufficiently larger than the residual
eigenvalues. There are two practical issues that we emphasize:
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Fig. 5 Theoretical and actual values of ‖ΦTKΦK − IK‖2
– How do we determine K, especially since we are unable to work on the original data
if it is too large. The theoretical results indicates that for sufficiently large M , one may
determine K using the compressed data instead. It means that one can start with the
maximum affordable value of M and analyze the compressed covariance matrix to de-
termine K.
– In practice, the eigenvalues may follow a decay distribution in many cases. When this
happens, there is no clear choice of K. As with the well-known principal component
analysis in statistics, one typically chooses a cut-off point at which at least, for example,
90% energy is retained. This is what we use in our work and works rather well.
We now turn the discussion to the tightness of the eigenvalue deviation bound. Upon
examining the proof, we found that the bounds are reasonably tight and it is difficult to
improve any further. Our bounds depend on the concentration result of Gaussian random
matrices which state that for a particular Gaussian random matrix ΦK of size M × K
where each entry follows N (0, 1/
√
M) the singular values are bounded by 1 ± ∆ with
a probability of at least 1 − δ, where ∆ is defined as (13). This implies that the singular
values of ΦTKΦK − IK are bounded by 1 ± 2∆. How tight is this theoretical bound in the
literature? To do so, we study the case where K = 5, N = 104, δ = 0.1 and vary M .
The theoretical and actual values of ‖ΦTKΦK − IK‖2 are shown in Fig. 5. From this plot,
we observe that the theoretical bound appears to be reasonable, though it is slightly conser-
vative. It is about twice the actual value on average. Thus, when using this several times,
we expect the bounds on the eigenvalues are also a few more times larger than the actual
values. To verify this, we consider the same setting and create a covariance matrix whose the
5 principal eigenvalues are 100. Then we directly compute the average eigenvalues of the
compressed covariance matrix obtained from random projection whilst M is varied. Fig. 6
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Fig. 6 Maximum average principal eigenvalue deviations
shows the maximum average deviation of the compressed eigenvalues, whilst Fig. 7 shows
the deviation of all principal eigenvalues at a particular M = N/2. The plots indicate that
the theoretical bounds are about 4-5 times larger than the actual one, but this is as expected.
Obviously, if the bound on spectral norm of Gaussian random matrix is tighter, our theo-
retical bound will be also tighter. However, it is noted that we have used the best bounds
available for Gaussian random matrices in the literature to date.
Whilst improving the bounds might be of future interest, the theoretical results impor-
tantly gives us a justification to the scalable framework that deals with large-scale network
data using random projection/compressed sensing via spectral methods. In the experimental
section, we shall illustrate this more clearly.
4.4 Discussion
From the above cases, one may also apply sub-sampling in both dimensions if they are both
large. In this case, it is natural to assert that the bound of the change in the false alarm is the
sum of the bounds derived in the above theorems. Thus, the bound is unavoidably increased
for trade-off both in the feature and instances dimensions. Nevertheless, it is only linear to
the reductions.
We note that our proposed method is rather general, and has not yet taken into account
the specific structure of a particular network. Without specialization, it is more suited to
the abnormality detection in general centralized networks. It is of interest to extend the
general theory here to the case of particular network structure. For example, in the case of
sensor networks where the sensors are organized in clusters or tree [21], it might be more
desirable to do in-network processing to further reduce the bandwidth. We thus leave the
specialization as future extension of the developed theory.
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Fig. 7 Principal eigenvalue deviation at M/N = 0.5
Finally, even though it is intuitive that random projection approximately preserves the
geometry, and thus one should expect the eigenvalues to follow suit, our theoretical results
are the first in the literature to provide two-sided bounds on all principal eigenvalues, and
thus this is a significant contribution to the literature. In comparison, we note the limitation
of some previous work:
– The text-book result [41] only provides a non-probabilistic one-sided bound for the
eigenvalues. Here, the bound is expressed in terms of the ε deviation due to random
projection, but this value is too difficult to compute for a given projection matrix.
– The early KDD paper [7] only gives practical demonstration that principal component
analysis works with random projection, but no theoretical justification is given as thor-
oughly as what we present here.
– The recent work in [18] studies only the first eigenvalue, but with a deterministic orthog-
onal projection matrix. Here, we use random Gaussian matrices that are only approxi-
mately orthogonal, and that we provide probabilistic bounds for all principal eigenval-
ues.
Moreover, we also derive the bound on the deviation of the false alarm, which is specifically
tailored to the anomaly detection problem.
5 Experimental Results
We evaluate our framework using both real-world and synthetic datasets experiments from
two application areas: network traffic analysis and video surveillance analysis. We evaluate
the performance of our framework for the sensor sub-sampling case with network data while
the temporal frame sub-sampling case performance is studied using video data.
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In all cases, we compare the proposed anomaly detection using the proposed strategy
(random projection) with the other relevant alternatives including the full data [30] and the
decentralization approach of [23]. We emphasize the following remarks
– As this work is concentrated on scalability strategy rather than outlier detection algo-
rithms, we compare different strategies for the same outlier detection algorithm using
residual subspace analysis to verify the scalability solution analyzed in this work. As
mentioned earlier in the introduction, the analyzed random projection strategy might
also work with other non-spectral algorithms, but it is beyond the scope of current work.
Furthermore, some other non-spectral algorithms might be application specific, which
requires additional assumptions and settings and comparing them directly is almost im-
possible. Thus, we restrict out attention to residual subspace analysis as the outlier de-
tection algorithm for consistency.
– Our main goal is to demonstrate that in a wide range of circumstances in data mining, the
proposed framework is indeed useful. In other words, the trade-off between compression
and deviation can be satisfactorily achieved. Thus, the compression parameter M does
not mean as a tuning hyperparameter, but should be viewed as a trade-off parameter
in the context. Also, for consistency, we determine the parameter K by using the 90%
principal energy as the guiding principle wherever we do not know K a priori.
5.1 Sensor Subsampling Results
The anomaly detection capability of the proposed framework is evaluated on a real-work
benchmark data set Abilene [1] and a synthetic dataset specifically designed to simulate a
large network.
5.1.1 Experiment on the Abilene Data
Abilene Dataset. The Abilene dataset [1] is a well-known dataset for network research, and
captured from a real-work backbone network. Its first use for volume anomaly detection is
documented in [30]. Here, we are primarily interested in anomalies resulting from abnor-
mal changes of the network traffic. The changes arise because of events such as abnormal
DNS transaction, network equipment failure, flash crowd occupancies, distributed denial-
of-service (DDoS) attacks [30]. Importantly, these changes cannot be detected from a sim-
ple thresholding due to the varying characteristics of normal traffic during a day. In Figs.
18(a) and 8, we plot the total network traffic for a period with and without volume anoma-
lies (highlighted in red). As can be seen, volume anomalies are often hidden under normal
network traffic. The preliminary investigation in [30] reveals that the spectral approach is
capable of detecting these anomalies. Our purpose in this experiment is to extend [30] to the
case where the data is not complete and verify the proposed method.
Data collection. In the Abilene network, the traffic flow is the amount of traffic flowing
in between each pair of ingress and egress nodes in the network. It is also known as an
origin-destination (OD) flow, which is the traffic that enters the backbone at the origin point
of presence (PoP) and exits at destination PoP [30]. The Abilene dataset consists of the
readings collected from 41 network links over a period of several months. The OD trace
contains the measurement from each link for each 10-second interval. We use a subset of
the data which covers a period of 2 weeks (1008 measurements per week). Most of the
data reflects normal network conditions with only 6 real anomalies (verified manually) in
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Fig. 8 Typical network link data: Normal (left) and Abnormal (right). Horizontal axis denotes the aggregated
window index, vertical axis denotes the ℓ1-norm of the vector of total traffic.
the original dataset. In addition, we inject 45 synthetic anomalies of different magnitudes
following the procedure described in [30]. We use the first week data for training and the
second week data for testing.
Improving Random Projection. As discussed earlier, the random projection is repre-
sented by a matrix Φ from which the compressed data is obtained via y = Φx. A good
random projection matrix should have columns as close to orthogonal as possible (in other
words small RIC) so that the geometry of data in high-dimensional space is preserved better
in the low-dimensional space. In other words, the mutual coherence of the overcomplete
system Φ = [φ1, . . . , φN ] , which is defined as:
µ(Φ) = max
i6=j
|〈φj , φk〉|, (14)
must be as small as possible. For a real-valued matrix Φ, the lower bound on the mutual
coherence is known as the Welch bound [39]:
µ(Φ) ≥
q
(N − M)/(M(N − 1)). (15)
For many classes of random matrices, the mutual coherence can be small with high proba-
bility. In cases where the problem size is not very large, such as in this Abilen dataset with
N is only 41, a random Gaussian matrix might not have good approximate orthogonality
property, which necessitates improvement in practice. To further improve the random pro-
jection matrix, we start with a random Gaussian matrix and then apply the recently proposed
algorithm by Elad [17]. This algorithm exploits the fact that the mutual coherence of Φ, with
each column normalized to unit norm, is the maximum magnitude of the off-diagonal ele-
ments of the Gram matrix G = ΦT Φ, where the Gram matrix has rank M . Hence, by
iteratively shrinking the entries of the Gram matrix, forcing its rank to M , and taking its
square root, a smaller mutual coherence for Φ with a specified rank M is achieved. Though
the algorithm could be sensitive to the parameter setting and its convergence is yet to be
studied, we found that in practice this method improves the mutual coherence considerably.
In practice, the actual signal x might not be sparse in the basis I but in some Ψ. In this
case, µ(ΦΨ) needs to be small instead. If Φo is the optimal sensing matrix for the basis I,
then the optimal matrix Φ for the basis Ψ is found from Φ = ΦoΨ
−1, assuming that Ψ is
invertible. For the Abilene network data, N = 41, M = 16, K = 6 and the Welch bound of
the sensing matrix is 0.1976. Using Elad’s algorithm [17], we achieve a mutual coherence
of 0.36 from the initial coherence of 0.55.
Anomaly detection. Residual subspace analysis is applied using different strategies:
complete, compressed, and decentralized data. Figures 9 and 10 show the similarity be-
tween the principal eigenvalues and the residual vectors using these strategies. We then
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16 Test Data in Residual Subspace (using Complete Input Data)






16 Test Data in Residual Subspace (using Compressed Data)






16Test Data in Residual Subspace (using Decentralized Input Data)
Fig. 9 Residual vector plots for Abilene data.
conduct experiments to obtain the receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curve which is
shown in Figure 11. We notice that the performance is very similar with all three strategies.
The performance on the compressed data is very close to that on the uncompressed and
decentralized strategies. To further quantify this, we also compare the ROC curves using (i)
the area under the ROC curve (AUC) and (ii) equal error rate (EER). An effective classifier
should achieve an AUC close to 1 and small ERR. From the ROC curves, we determine that
the AUC/EER values are 0.95/0.09, 0.96/0.11, and 0.95/0.10 for the original, compressed,
and decentralized data respectively.
5.1.2 Experiment on Synthetic Network Traffic Data
Synthetic Data Generation. We generate synthetic network traffic data following the proce-
dure in [30]. In particular, we consider a network where the number of local monitors N
ranges from 500 to 2000 and the number of time instances L = 2000. The network traffic
signal is modeled as x as x = s+n where x ∈ RN . It consists of two parts: s characterizes
the long-term structure in the data and n represents the local temporal variation. For the
long-term network traffic signal, s = Ψsαs. Here, Ψs is the basis for the intrinsic network
data. Due to its daily periodic characteristics, we select the discrete cosine transform (DCT)
matrix as the basis. The number of principal components is K = 4. We simply model
the noise as zero-mean Gaussian with variance σ2 = 0.01. To simulate abnormal network
conditions, we inject 70 anomalies of different magnitudes.
Anomaly detection. When specifying the dimension M for random projection, we need
to consider the trade-off between performance and error rates. Selecting a smaller value of
18 Duc-Son Pham† et al.






















































Fig. 10 Eigenvalue distribution for Abilene data.
































Fig. 11 ROC curves for the Abilene data
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Fig. 12 Trade-off: computation (left) and error rate (right).





Test Data in Residual Subspace (using Complete Input Data)





Test Data in Residual Subspace (using Compressed Data)





Test Data in Residual Subspace (using Decentralized Input Data)
Fig. 13 Residual vector plots for synthetic data.
M reduces the computational complexity at the cost of a potentially lower performance due
to the increase in the mutual coherence of the random projection matrix. In the CS literature,
the value of O(K log N) has been frequently suggested. We set N = 2000, vary M be-
tween 100 to 1000 and measure the EER and computational time. The results are shown in
Figs. 12(a) and 12(b). Selecting M in the range 250− 300 gives moderately low error rates
at a large reduction in computational time. If M is too low, the error rate becomes larger.
If M is too large, the reduction in error rate is not significant whilst the computational time
increases somewhat quadratically. Therefore, we determine that suitable values of M are
118, 280, and 450 when number of nodes are 500, 1000 and 2000 respectively. The random
projection matrices are improved from random Gaussian with a final mutual coherence of
0.37, 0.35 and 0.20 respectively.
With the specified random projection matrix, we then examine the behavior of the resid-
ual vectors using complete and compressed data. Figs. 13 and 14 demonstrate the result.












Eigenvalue distribution : Decentralized data
Fig. 14 Eigenvalue distribution for synthetic data.
Once again, we observe that the patterns of the eigenvalue distribution and the residual vec-
tors are similar in both complete and compressed data cases. We then explore the detection
performance by comparing residual subspace analysis using compressed data with that us-
ing complete data [30], and the decentralized version presented in [23]. The ROC curves for
these three cases are shown in Fig. 15. In terms of AUC, the detection with the compressed
data is approximately equivalent (even sightly better than) to the other cases.

























Complete:      AUC=0.977
Decentralized: AUC=0.983
Compressed : AUC=0.985
Fig. 15 ROC performance
Next, Figure 16 compares these three strategies in terms of communication, computa-
tion and storage overhead. It shows that by using compressed data compared to other two
strategies we can reduce the communication bandwidth by 45% to 60% , computational cost
by 80% to 90%, and storage requirement 45% to 70% as compared with other two strategies.























Fig. 16 Communication, computational and storage complexity. The strategies are: Complete Data (1), De-
centralization (2), and Compressed Data (3)
Finally, we vary the size of the network from 100 to 2000 and the result is shown in
Table 1. The AUC and EER indicators are as competitive as those using complete data, with
a better computational performance, it is from 6 to 1000 times faster.
Table 1 Anomaly detection performance on synthetic data.
Metric N 100 500 1000 2000
Complete 0.023 0.430 3.364 20.932
Time (seconds) Compressed 0.004 0.023 0.097 0.203
Decentralized 0.021 0.425 3.360 20.90
Complete 0.993 0.996 0.982 0.986
AUC Compressed 0.997 0.991 0.984 0.979
Decentralized 0.995 0.994 0.981 0.98
Complete 0.060 0.080 0.090 0.090
EER Compressed 0.060 0.080 0.020 0.020
Decentralized 0.060 0.080 0.090 0.10
5.2 Temporal Frame Subsampling
5.2.1 Problem Background and Datasets
Next we evaluate the performance of our framework when dealing with temporal sampling
(Section 4.2.2) and determine the suitability of our work in addressing a real-world surveil-
lance problem faced of a local public transport authority. The local train network monitoring
system consists of over 3000 cameras operating 24 hours a day. Constant human operator
supervision of video is impossible. The problem of detecting anomalies in the video is chal-
lenging because (1) most anomalous patterns occur in the presence of normal patterns (a
majority of people behave normally) and (2) there is no predefined description of anoma-
lous behavior - the anomaly changes with the context of the scene (a person walking at
normal pace on the rail tracks is considered as anomalous whereas the same behavior would
be normal if it occurs on the station platform).
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We use two video surveillance datasets: one provided by the local public transport au-
thority and the PETS 2007 benchmark dataset [2]. The PETS 2007 data was used to demon-
strate the effectiveness of our work on an established dataset as the video sequences are
freely available from the PETS archive [2]. Both video datasets are pre-processed to extract
motion features. In both cases, the ground truth data is available. Training is done offline
and testing is performed on the incoming data streams
5.2.2 Video Data Pre-Processing and Feature Extraction.
We use optical flow [33] to define the motion in the scene. The advantage of such low-
features, collected in a grid superimposed on the images, is that they provide good informa-
tion about motion whilst alleviating the need for object tracking [4]. The limitation of this

















Fig. 17 Schematic description of the proposed method.
5.2.3 Motion-based representation:
Each image is divided into grid-based regions and the motion statistics of each cell in an
image is computed over a pre-defined time bin. The motion distribution of each cell is simply
calculated as the number of optic flow vectors in that cell. Figures 18(a) and 18(b) show the
the amalgamated motion flows over 300 frames for 2 sequences from the data collected from
surveillance cameras in a train station. In Figure 18(a), we plot the volume of the motion
flows, which is the squared norm of the vector of motion statistics from all cells. Each point
shows the motion statistics amalgamated over one minute. Generally, the characteristics of
the normal motion volume is “high” if there is a train in the station, otherwise it remains
“low” giving rise to periodic rise and fall.
The majority of past relevant work [8,34,37] has treated the whole scene as either “nor-
mal” or “abnormal”, but these examples suggest that a framework which can detect abnor-
mality in presence of the normal behavior is needed. Our intuition is to capture the structure
of the overall normal pattern in the principal subspace. We now give some analytical argu-
ments to justify the proposed method. In the subway example, passengers would normally
follow the ”walk” path to enter and exit. The normal activities induce a distribution of mo-
tion vectors over the cells in the subway. Importantly, this distribution also signifies the
relationship between the cells. For example, some cells tend to be highly correlated due
to the average flow of the traffic through the cells. This dependence gives us important in-
formation about the structural pattern of normal events. Thus, if, for example, a person or a
group crosses the subway tunnel in an unusual manner, the observed motion distribution will
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(a) During a normal period









(b) During a period with anomalies
Fig. 18 Amalgamated optical flows over one minute interval. Horizontal axis denotes aggregated window
index, vertical axis denotes normalized ℓ2-norm of the aggregated motion count vector.
carry totally new structural information. This is the basis for our abnormality detection tech-
nique. Similarly, a loitering person is likely to lead to the observation that the cells covering
the loitering trajectory become more correlated than normal. If this structural information is
known, we can separate the normal activity by projecting the observed motion pattern onto
the space induced by the structure, so that abnormal activities can be easily investigated in
the residual subspace.
Localized bag-of-visual-words: We are motivated by [35] to use bag-of-visual words for
representing the optic flow count in the cells. Niebles et al. [35] derive visual words from the
the human activity in the spatio-temporal domain. Using a grid-based approach we extract
optic flow counts for each cell. We consider each cell similar to a term and motion statis-
tics (i.e. number of motion flows) of each cell as equivalent to word frequency. Hence, the
number of terms is equal to the number cells in the image. We construct the feature-frame
matrix in an analogous manner to the term-document matrix. Denote the number of cells as
N and the motion statistics of cell i at frame l as xi(l). The vector of motion statistics is
defined as xl = [x1(l), . . . , xN (l)]
T . For a sequence of L frames, the feature-frame matrix
is defined as X = [x1, . . . ,xL]. In document analysis, the semantic variables (topics) gov-
ern the probabilistic occurrence of the terms. Similarly in our case, the structural variables
of the normal behavior govern the distribution of motion vectors over cells.
For detection, we project the compressed data onto the compressed residual subspace
and use the Q-statistic as described in Section 3.1. Figure 17 shows the schematic descrip-
tion of the proposed method.
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5.2.4 Results on the PETS2007 Benchmark Video Data.
The PETS2007 [2] dataset consists of video footage obtained from a multiple camera surveil-
lance system. For the PETS datasets processing, the time granularity for aggregating the
motion count was set to 100 frames. For training, we use the S0 sequences which consisted
of 4500 frames captured at a resolution of 720×576. The sequences containing no unusual
events and no externally injected “actors”, and the crowd density typically (depending on
the camera) is medium.
The first PETS2007 test sequence used was S3 captured by camera 1. The sequence
consists of 2970 frames and the anomaly was a theft event. It involved two actors walking
normally towards the middle of the scene where after a brief stop, they proceed to pick a bag
and leave the area. As this event takes place, there is a significant flow of people in the top
part of the scene. Hence, for our approach to produce the correct results, it would need to
detect the anomaly and correctly highlight the time interval over which the anomalous event
take place. As the sequence is short, PCA was applied directly on the features extracted from
the training sequence and the eigenvalues are plotted in Figure 19. We chose the largest three
eigenvalues (i.e. K = 3) for the principal subspace, while the rest of the eigenvectors span
the residual subspace. The threshold Qβ was computed according to the 1 − β confidence
level and we chose β = 0.005. Figures 20(i) and (ii) show the projection of each column of
XTrain and XTest into the residual subspace and the horizontal line denotes the threshold
Qβ . The theft event is clearly highlighted in the residual subspace as the threshold Qβ is
exceeded. It should be noted that the plot for the residual domain shows two peaks, which
correspond to events which are 50 frames apart and are thus considered to be part of the same
anomalous event. A number of corresponding frames within the area where the anomaly
takes place are shown in Figure 21.













Fig. 19 The magnitude of the eigenvalues computed from matrix X for XTrain (sequence S0, camera 1).
Similar results were obtained for sequences S6 from camera 1 (anomaly involves more
than 3 actors) and sequence S3 from camera 2. To test the robustness of the approach in
different environmental conditions, we use sequence S3 captured by camera 3 as a test set
(with the sequence S0 from camera 3 used for training). Figure 22 show the residual vec-
tors of the training and testing sets. Despite the different lighting and camera angles, our
approach detects the anomalous event successfully. The results from the four sequences are
summarized in the top four entries of Table 2.
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Fig. 20 Plots of the residual vectors over train data (subfigure (i): sequence S0, camera 1) and test data
(subfigure (ii): sequence S3, camera 1) from the PETS 2007 dataset. Horizontal axis denotes aggregated
window index, vertical axis denote squares of ℓ2-norm.
Fig. 21 The detected “anomalous” activity in sequence 3 from camera 1 (PETS2007 dataset).
5.2.5 Results on Public Transport Authority Dataset:
The third set of experiments use video footage from four different train stations. The com-
bined set consists of surveillance video data collected over a week. Importantly, it con-
tains several types of anomalous events that were not artificially created and were ground-
truthed in conjunction with the transport authorities. In the previous experiment on the PETS
dataset, we have shown the effectiveness of volume anomaly detection framework. Here, we
demonstrate the scalability of our proposed approach for this type of data.
For the first evaluation, we used the video data captured from the corridors of the train
station in the peak hours of the day (7AM to 11 AM) over a week. The 25fps video data at
resolution 570×720 is collected by two different cameras at the entry and exit points of the
train station. For the training set XTrain we used video from five consecutive days where
each day has 4 hours continuous video and day 6th (XTest1) and 7
th (XTest2) are used
for testing only. For training, the original number of aggregated time bins is L = 7200, the
number of grid cells is N = 100, and the window length is 10s.
As mentioned Section 4.2.2, we have sub-sampled the temporal stream data, so that the
number of snapshots is reduced to M when the length of the snapshots (L) is large and
M ≪ L. The challenge was to select the value of M for an optimal performance. Figure 23
shows the plots for the false positive rate (FPR) and the rate of anomaly detection (both were
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normalized to 1), when M varies from 100 to 300 for the above mentioned datasets. When
M is in the range of 190 ∼ 230, the FPR is at a minimum and detection rate is maximized.
Hence, we have used M = 220 for this experiment.


















Fig. 22 Plots of the residual vectors over train data (subfigure (i): sequence S0, camera 3) and test data
(subfigure (ii): sequence S3, camera 3) from the PETS 2007 dataset. Horizontal axis denotes aggregated
window index, vertical axis denote squares of ℓ2-norm.




































Fig. 23 Plots for FPR and the rate of anomaly detection, when M varies from 100 to 300 for the above
mentioned full datasets
We first examine the behavior of the eigenvalue distribution and the residual vectors
using different strategies to verify the theoretical contributions. Figs 24, 25, and 26 show the
results for complete, compressed, and decentralized data. We select K = 4 to cover 90%
energy in the principal subspace respectively. The threshold Qβ was computed in a similar
way to the previous experiment with the desired false alarm being β = 0.005. The residual
plots are similar in all three cases. We detect two real anomalies out of three from the test
data with the detected anomalies corresponding to (1) an adult rubbing a small child against
the wall and (2) a group of people loitering (Fig. 27). The missing anomaly was due to the
fact that it take place far away from the camera and the motion features are unreliable. We
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repeat the same experiment with the second test set (XTest2) and detect the anomalous event
“group loitering” (shown in Fig. 27) which occurred during “off-peak” hours.
For the second evaluation, we use five video sequences captured from cameras covering
the stairs (1 sequence), an automated vending machine (1 sequence) and the rail tracks from
two different stations (3 sequences). Both the stairs and vending machine sequences are
long (8 and 16 hours respectively). In the case of the rail tracks data, two of the train and test
sequences are short, while the third sequence is again very long (18 hours). In all cases the
video was captured at 25 frames per second with a resolution of 570×720. For the training
set XTrain2, we use a total of 27 hours of continuous video (without any anomaly) and
55 hours of video for testing (XTest3 - some of the video which involve zoom action was
removed as we restrict the evaluation to static views).
For XTrain2, the parameters were L = 36, 294 and N = 100 while the M value is set
to 220 for the long video sequences. For the two shorter video sequences, the value of M is
set to 50. For all five sequence, the threshold Qβ is computed in a similar way to the previous
experiment with β = 0.005. A total of 14 anomalies are present in the video streams and our
approach is able to identify 13 anomalies correctly while producing one false negative and
8 false positives. One false positive is due to difficulty of differentiating between a person
breaking into the vending machine (who opened the machine with a cordless drill) and the
maintenance person (who also opened the vending machine with a drill). The false negative








(a) Eigenvalue distribution. Horizontal axis: compo-
nent index, vertical axis: eigenvalue.









(b) Residual vectors. Horizontal axis: aggregated
window index, vertical axis: squared ℓ2-norm.
Fig. 24 Data statistics when using complete PTA dataset.








(a) Eigenvalue distribution. Horizontal axis: compo-
nent index, vertical axis: eigenvalue.









(b) Residual vectors. Horizontal axis: aggregated
window index, vertical axis: squared ℓ2-norm.


















Fig. 26 Data statistics when using compressed PTA dataset. Horizontal axis denotes component index (left)
and aggregated window index (right). Vertical axis denotes eigenvalue (left) and square ℓ2-norm (right).
Fig. 27 Anomaly detection in Public Surveillance Data: leaning on the wall (left), hanging out in groups







































PETS(CAM 1 SEQ 3) 4,500 2,971 1 1 0 0
PETS(CAM 1 SEQ 6) 4,500 2,735 1 1 0 0
PETS(CAM 2 SEQ 3) 4,500 2,971 1 1 1 0
PETS(CAM 3 SEQ 3) 4,500 2,972 1 1 0 0
PTA Dataset (Tunnel) 90,000 90,000 3 2 0 1
PTA Dataset (Stairs) 100,000 36,770 2 2 0 0
PTA Dataset - Rail Track
(Station1 Cam 1)
6,234 10,504 2 2 0 0
PTA Dataset - Rail Track
(Station1 Cam 2 (Far view)
6,363 10,479 2 2 3 0
PTA Dataset - Rail Track
(Station2 Cam 1 (Far view)
450,239 660,002 3 3 5 0
PTA Dataset - Soft Drink
Vending Machine
529,410 1,311,890 2 2 1 0
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6 Conclusions
We have presented a framework for detecting anomalies in data streams captured by large-
scale sensor networks. The work addresses a key problem of dealing with incomplete data
because of the physical constraints imposed in large-scale networks. The framework fur-
ther establishes the usefulness of random projection/CS as an effective solution for anomaly
detection for both the case when the number of sensors or the number of data instances
exceeds the communication bandwidth in a sensor network. The work exploits the fact that
the intrinsic dimension of the data in typical sensor network applications is generally small
relative to the raw dimension and the fact that compressed sensing is capable of capturing
most information with few measurements. We have shown that spectral methods used for
anomaly detection can be directly applied to the compressed data with guarantees on per-
formance and we have demonstrated the effectiveness of the framework using both real and
synthetic datasets.
Proof of Theorem 1
First, we can assume without loss of generality that the covariance matrix in the original
domain Σx is diagonal. Indeed, suppose that the its eigenvalue decomposition is
Σx = ΨΛΨ
T , (16)




= (ΦΨ)Λ (ΦΨ)T . (17)
But as Ψ is an unitary matrix due to the definition of the eigenvalue decomposition, it
follows that ΦΨ is also a random Gaussian matrix with the same statistical properties as Φ
due to Lemma 1. Thus, in the study of the eigenvalues in the compressed domain, we can







where ΛK = diag(λ1, . . . , λK) is the diagonal of K principal eigenvalues in the original
domain, where λ1 ≥ λ2 . . . ≥ λK , and ΛR is the diagonal sub-matrix of the residual
eigenvalues. Assume that the residual eigenvalues are sufficiently smaller compared with
the principal eigenvalues, and denote the first K columns of the projection matrix Φ as




We now shall show that Σy also has a matching principal subspace in a sense that the
K principal eigenvalues of Σy, which we denote by ξ1, . . . , ξK are close to the K principal





= ΦTKΦK ΛK Φ
T
KΦK . (20)
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Denote as κ1, κ2, . . . , κK the eigenvalues of Σz. Our strategy is first to show that |ξi −
κi|, i = 1, . . . , K are small, and |λi − κi|, i = 1, . . . , K are also small. Then we deduce
the bound on |ξi − λi|, i = 1, . . . , K.
The mathematical foundation of our proof consists of
– The concentration bound of the spectral norm of Gausian random matrices (see see [20]
[10] for example). It follows from the theory that for the Gaussian random matrix ΦK
of size M × K where each entry follows N (0, 1/
√
M), the extreme singular values
satisfy for some t > 0:
Pr(σmax(ΦK)) < 1 +
q
K/M + t) ≥ 1 − e−M t
2
2 , (21)
Pr(σmin(ΦK)) > 1 −
q
K/M − t) ≥ 1 − e−M t
2
2 . (22)
Let δ = e−N
t
2
2 or equivalently t =
p
2 ln(1/δ)/N , then the following hold with a
probability of at least 1 − δ,














2 ln(1/δ)/M , then the concentration bound implies that
the Gaussian random matrix ΦK is approximately unitary in a sense that the singular
values are close to 1 when K ≪ M , with a probability of at least 1 − δ
1 − ∆ ≤ σmin(ΦK) ≤ σmax(ΦK) ≤ 1 + ∆. (25)
It is also useful to note that when K ≪ M , the variation ∆ is sufficiently small and thus
we can deduce
1 − 2∆ ≤ σmin(ΦTKΦK) ≤ σmax(ΦTKΦK) ≤ 1 + 2∆. (26)
– The approximate invariant subspace Theorem 8.1.11 in [22]. This theorem governs the
bound on the sigular values of a covariance matrix when projected from high to low
using an approximate unitary transformation. Suppose Σ1 ∈ Rn×n is a symmetric
matrix, and T ∈ Rn×k is an approximate unitary transformation matrix. Then the k
largest singular values of Σ2 = T
T Σ1T are close to those of Σ1 by the following





+ ‖TT T − Ik‖2‖Σ1‖2
«
, (27)
where ‖ • ‖2 denotes the matrix norm.
With the above results, we are now ready to obtain the bounds as follows.
For Σy and Σz = Φ
T
KΣyΦK :





+ ‖ΦTKΦK − IK‖2‖Σy‖2
«
. (28)
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Using (25) and (25), we bound each term with a probability of at least 1 − δ as follows
‖ΣyΦK − ΦKΣz‖2 = ‖ΦKΛKΦTKΦK − ΦKΦTKΣyΦK‖2 (29)
= ‖ΦKΛKΦTKΦK − ΦKΦTKΦKΛKΦTKΦK‖2 (30)
= ‖ΦK(IK − ΦTKΦK)ΛKΦTKΦK‖2 (31)
≤ ‖ΦK‖2‖(IK − ΦTKΦK)‖2‖ΛK‖2‖ΦTKΦK‖2 (32)
≤ (1 + ∆) × 2∆ × λ1 × (1 + 2∆) ≈ 2∆λ1, (33)
‖ΦTKΦK − IK‖2 ≤ 2 ∆, (34)
‖Σy‖2 = ‖ΦKΛKΦTK‖2 (35)
≤ ‖ΦK‖2‖ΛK‖2‖ΦTK‖2 (36)
≤ (1 + ∆) × λ1 × (1 + ∆) ≈ (1 + 2∆)λ1, (37)
‖σK(ΦK)‖2 ≥ 1 − ∆. (38)
Using these bounds, it follows that with a probability of at least 1 − δ









2∆λ1, i = 1, 2, . . . , K. (39)




KΦK : Let T = Φ
T
KΦK then





+ ‖TT T − IK‖2‖ΛK‖2
«
. (40)
Again, we bound each term with a probability of at least 1−δ as follows (note that TT = T)
‖ΛKT − TΣz‖2 = ‖ΛKT − TTΛKT‖2 (41)
= ‖(IK − TT T)ΛKT‖2 (42)
≤ ‖(IK − TT T)‖2‖ΛK‖2‖T‖2 (43)
≤ 4∆ × λ1 × (1 + 2∆) ≈ 4∆λ1, (44)
‖σK(T)‖2 ≥ 1 − 2∆, (45)
‖TT T − IK‖2 ≤ 4∆. (46)
Using these bounds, it follows that with a probability of at least 1 − δ









2∆λ1, i = 1, 2, . . . , K. (47)
Thus, from (39) and (47) we can deduce the bound on |λi − ξi|, i = 1, . . . , K. We note that
a triangle inequality immediately gives
|λi − ξi| ≤ |λi − κi| + |ξi − κi|. (48)
However, such bound can be still improved. This is because we note that if we take ΛK as a








Thus, every time we perform an approximate orthogonal projection by ΦK , the singular
values are moved further away from those of the original matrix. Also, due to the construc-






KΦK , we conclude that the singular values of
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Σz even move further away from those of ΛK . This can be obviously seen with the largest
singular values, where we have shown that
ξ1 ≤ (1 + 2∆)λ1, (49)
κ1 ≤ (1 + 2∆)ξ1 ≤ (1 + 4∆)λ1. (50)
Thus, every time an approximate orthogonal transformation is applied, the bound on the
singular values becomes larger. This implies that the tightest bound on the singular values
of |λi − ξi| can be obtained by the difference between the bound on |λi −κi| and |ξi −κi|.
It follows that with a probability of at least 1 − δ












i = 1, 2, . . . , K. (51)
Proof of Theorem 2 (Bound on false alarm rate)

























Fig. 28 Tail behavior for complete data and compressed data. The solid curve represents the tail of the
distribution of the normalized statistic when complete data is used. The two dashed curved represent two
possible tails of the distribution of the normalized statistic but when compressed data is used instead. The
shaded areas represent the change in the false alarm in the two cases.
The residual statistics has normal distribution and the false alarm rate depends strongly
on the tail. The previous proof has shown that the principal eigenvalues experience a small
change under a random projection. Next, we show that there is also a small deviation in the
false alarm rate. Our strategy is based on perturbation analysis of the tail of the distribution
of the decision statistic. Figure 28 illustrates the tail behavior in the original and compressed
domains. Here, ZXβ denotes the normalized statistic in the original domain. The false alarm
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for original data is the area under the distribution curve from zXβ to ∞. Due to compression,
suppose that the normalized statistic associated with the compressed data moves by zXβ ±
δzXβ . Thus, the change in the false alarm can be calculated as the change of the tail area,
which gives
∆ Pr(FA) = N (zxβ)δzxβ . (52)
In what follows, we use the results of the previous proof to evaluate such changes in the
false alarm. We note in the above expression, N (zxβ) is the value of the normal distribution
at zxβ and is assumed known for a given desired false alarm β. For example, with a desired
false alarm of 1%, this is approximately 0.0267. Then it remains to compute the change δzxβ
due to random projection to obtain compressed data.
We start with the result in Section 3 of [24], which states that the residual statistics Q





= Z ∼ N (µ, σ) , (53)
where



















i , h0 = 1 − 2θ1θ33θ2
2
and K
being the number of principal components.
Denote as zxβ , µx, σx and z
y
β , µy, σy the detection threshold, mean, and standard devia-
tion of the respected distributions in the original and compressed domain, and Cβ = 1 − β
as the percentile of the normal distribution with an desired false alarm β. Here,






































= Cβ . (56)
By writing Zxβ −Zyβ = (µx −µy) + Cβ(σx −σy) and applying the triangle inequality, we
obtain
δzxβ = |Zxβ − Zyβ | ≤ |(µx − µy)| + Cβ |(σx − σy)|. (57)
We next bound each term in (57). Once again, we use perturbation analysis by considering
the functions
fµ(θ1, θ2, θ3) = 1 +
θ2h0(h0 − 1)
θ21
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These functions allow the computation of the changes in the mean and standard deviation.
For example,














|θxi − θyi |. (62)
We note that the partial derivatives are straightforward, so it remains to derive |θxi − θyi |. To














i i = 1, 2, 3. (64)
From (63) and (64), we obtain
δ1 = θ
x




((λxj ) − (ξyj )). (65)
We now attempt to bound each RHS term of (65). First, for the trace terms we recall that
tr(Σx) − tr(Σy) = tr(Σx) − tr(ΦΣxΦT ) (66)
From the previous remark, we can assume Σx is a diagonal matrix. Σx = diag(λ1, . . . , λN ).
Let, φi be the i






















Since, each column of the matrix Φ is normalized to unity then,
tr(ΦΣxΦ
T) = tr(Σx). (68)
Thus, the trace term in (65) is zero. Meanwhile, it follows from (51) with a probability of at
least 1 − δ that







2 ln(1/δ)/M is a small number. Similarly, for the second- and
third-order terms
|θx2 − θy2 | ≤ K4
√
2 × 2∆λ21 = 8
√
2Kλ21∆, (70)
|θx3 − θy3 | ≤ K4
√
2 × 3∆λ31 = 12
√
2Kλ31∆. (71)
Thus, we can bound the variation in the mean as follows





































































































































As θi, Cβ , K are constants when we study the bound on the change in the false alarm as a
function of M , all the derivatives are constant. The above results indicate that the change in
the false alarm depends linearly on ∆, which implies with a probability of at least 1 − δ:











Preservation of Gaussianity under Unitary Transformation
The following lemma may appear in a standard statistical text. For completeness, the result
and its proof is given to support the claim in the main theorem.
Lemma 1 Suppose that Φ ∈ RM×N is an iid random matrix whose entries follow a zero-
mean Gaussian distribution with variance σ2. Let U ∈ RN×N be a unitary matrix. Then
Φ′ = ΦU is also an iid Gaussian random matrix with the same variance σ2.
First we prove that E[φ′ij ] = E[φij ] = 0 and Var[φ
′
ij ] = σ
2. We start from φ′ij =
Pn
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